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English Only?-The "Power" of Kentucky's
Official Language Statute
Mark A. Flores'
It happens that there are many different languages in the world, and none
is meaningless; but if I do not know the meaning of a language, I shall be
a foreigner to one who speaks it, and one who speaks it a foreigner to me.'
1Corinthians 14:10-11
INTRODUCTION

AUnited States citizen struggles to speak English, yet he still walks into
f
voting booth ready to cast his ballot in an election. 3 While there, he
faces "difficulties and rude treatment at the polls. ''4 Others in his situation
face similar difficulties and in some instances leave "without casting a ballot
due to the absence of bilingual assistance and interference by poll workers
'5
and others in [their ability to select] the assistors of their choice.
In this particular case, the United States Department of Justice came to
6
the defense of the Spanish-speaking voters of Springfield, Massachusetts.
The city and the Department of Justice reached a settlement under the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 that provided, in relevant part, the following:
3. The City shall ensure that Spanish-speaking voters are permitted
assistance from persons of the voters' choice .... and that such assistance

shall include assistance in the voting booth, including reading or interpreting
the ballot and instructing voters on how to select the voters' preferred
candidates.
5. All information that is disseminated by Springfield in English about
"registration or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other

i Bachelor of Journalism, i999, Business Foundations Certificate, 1999, University of
Texas at Austin; Juris Doctor expected aoio, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author wishes to thank his wife and son for their patience and support throughout his law school
career as well as all those who have helped along the way.
2 1 Corinthians14:10-11.
3 SeeComplaint at 2-3, United States v.City of Springfield, No. 06-30123-MAP (D. Mass.
Aug. 2, zoo6), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting//sec-2o3/documents/springfield-

comp.pdf.
4 Id. at 3.

5 Id.
6 Id.
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materials or information relating to the electoral process, including ballots"
...shall also be provided in the Spanish language.'
The settlement also called for training, an advisory committee,
and monitoring.8 This settlement remained in effect until March of
2009.9 Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, under which the
Department of Justice brought its case in Springfield, Massachusetts.
While the Court refused to decide the question of the constitutionality of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
No. One v. Holder, it nevertheless stated the following:
More than [forty] years ago, this Court concluded that "exceptional
conditions" prevailing in certain parts of the country justified extraordinary
legislation [like the Voting Rights Act of 1965] otherwise unfamiliar to
our federal system. In part due to the success of that legislation, we are
now a very different Nation. Whether conditions continue to justify such
legislation is a difficult constitutional question we do not answer today.10
Thus, while not declaring the Voting Rights Act of 1965 unconstitutional,
the Court hinted that it might not survive future constitutional attacks.
Commentators acknowledge the underlying tenor of the Holder decision.
Edward Blum, the director of the Project on Fair Representation
(hereinafter the "Project"), an organization that challenges race-based
7 Revised Agreed Settlement Order at 4-5, United States v. City of Springfield, No. o630123-MAP (D. Mass. Sept. 13, zoo6), available at http:l/www.usdoj.gov/crtlvoting//sec2o3/

documents/springfieldcd.pdf.
8 Id.at 9-12.
9 Id. at 14.
io Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, z516 (2009) (citing
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966)). It is important to note that Justice
Thomas filed the only dissent in this eight to one decision. Id. at 2517 (Thomas, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part). In his concurrence/dissent, Justice Thomas wanted to go further
than the majority and hold the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
unconstitutional. Id. at 2519. In doing so, he compared the present state of this country to its
history of post-Civil War racism which prompted the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments when he stated the following:
In 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in order to guarantee
that no citizen would be denied the right to vote based on race, color,
or previous condition of servitude. Congress passed [the preclearance
requirement] of the [Voting Rights Act] in 1965 because that promise
had remained unfulfilled for far too long. But now-more than [forty]
years later-the violence, intimidation, and subterfuge that led Congress
to pass [the preclearance requirement] and this Court to uphold it no
longer remains.
Id. at 2527.
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government policies, described the decision as "an excellent first chop on
the log."" Blum expressed his expectation of another lawsuit challenging
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 when he claimed that
"[the Project has] won the first battle, but the war is not over."'"
While the country continues to question the policies and legality of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, states continue their assault against nonEnglish citizens and their ability to vote. 13 This assault affects not only
the Latino population, but also Asian Americans and other citizens of this
country. 4 The "English-Only movement"'" continues to gain momentum
as part of the backlash against immigration.'6 Outgoing Republican
Kentucky Senator Jim Bunning circulated a letter to his colleagues stating,
"[I1n the midst of the largest wave of immigration in our history, there
are troubling signs we are letting this priceless gift of unity, our common
language, slip away."' 7 The letter was intended to inform fellow senators
of the importance of a National Language Act making English the official
language of government. 8
As a result of the continued emphasis on English-only statutes and the
possibility that civil rights legislation like the Voting Rights Act of 1965 could
face more constitutional challenges, 19 the procedures used to vote in the
United States could face a major crossroads as the courts attempt to balance
the interests of non-English speaking voters against the interests of local
governments in conducting elections in the manner they see fit. This Note
will analyze this problem using Kentucky's current restrictions on nonEnglish writings. Part I will state the current law of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky requiring English for all writings, 0 determine how the Kentucky
Board of Elections interprets the statute, and discuss the effects it has on

ii See, e.g., Damien Cave, Ruling Prompts a Mixed Response, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at
AI6 (quoting Edward Blum) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12 Id. (quoting Edward Blum) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 196-98.
14 See ASIAN AM. LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, ASIAN AMERICAN ACCESS TO DEMOCRACY IN
THE 2006 ELECTION I (2008), avaliable at http://www.aaldef.org/docsIElection_2oo6_Report_
AALDEEpdf. Asian-American voters had trouble finding "[i]nterpreters and translated voting materials." Id. Non-English speaking voters found "[ploll workers were hostile and
made racist remarks." Id. The poll workers also made "improper or excessive demands for
identification." Id. See also Associated Press, Alaskans Back Vote to End Alcohol Ban; Eskimos
Wary, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at A4.
15 William M. Welch, English-Only Laws GatheringSteam, USA TODAY, June 19, 2oo8, at
3A.
16 Phil Kent, Editorial, Equal Time: Don't Encourage Miscommunication, THE ATLANTA
J.-CoNsT., Mar. 9, 2007, at A1 5.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Seesupra text accompanying notes 3-18.
2o Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.o6o(2) (West aoo6).
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Kentucky citizens. Part II will demonstrate how this interpretation violates
Kentucky's constitutional requirement that "[a]ll elections shall be free
and equal.""1 Part III will explain how this interpretation violates the First
Amendment as incorporated by the equal protection provisions of both
the Kentucky and Federal Constitutions. Part IV will apply this analysis
on a national scale. Finally, Part V will examine these interpretations and
decisions in light of recent attacks on the Voting Rights Act of 1965 before
the United States Supreme Court.
I.

KENTUCKY STATUTE-WRITINGS REQUIRED

To

BE IN ENGLISH.

As the 2010 census quickly approaches, the Kentucky State Board of
Elections (hereinafter the "Board") will keep a close eye on the numbers
coming out of Washington, D.C."2 Executive Director Sarah Johnson
explains that the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 will require Kentucky
to print all documents in Spanish and provide interpreters if the amount of
Spanish-speaking citizens in the state reaches a threshold of five percent
or 10,000 Spanish-speaking voters in a political subdivision. 3 This is a
scenario many states have faced in the past and will face in the immediate
24
future.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 came up for renewal in 2006.5 Nearly
eighty Republican Representatives signed a letter speaking out against the
provisions mandating that states print ballots in other languages or provide

21 Ky. CONST. § 6.
22 Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, Executive Director, Ky. State Bd. of
Elections, in Frankfort, Ky. (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Jan. 2oo9 Telephone Interview with
Sarah Johnson].
23 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-Ia(a)-(b)( 1) (2oo6). Johnson believes none of Kentucky's political subdivisions will come close to the trigger in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 at this time.
She also notes the first election it would affect in Kentucky, should the non-English speaking population reach the trigger in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, is 2012. Johnson says the
Justice Department would send out notices if this occurred in any Kentucky political subdivisions to the State Board of Elections. Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, Executive
Director, Ky. State Bd. of Elections, in Frankfort, Ky. (Mar. 16, 2oo) [hereinafter Mar. 2010
Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson]. Though the language most likely to raise this issue
in Kentucky is Spanish, other non-English languages are equally applicable. As such, Spanish
should only be considered as a framework for non-English languages in the face of this policy
with the understanding that this Note applies to all non-English speaking citizens, not just
Spanish speakers.
24 See, e.g., Bill Egbert, Westchester to Up PollAidforHispanics, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Jan. 20,
2005, at 2;Craig Gilbert, Sensenbrenner Backs Keeping BilingualBallots; Immigration FireFeeds
on Mandate Extension, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 5, 2006, at A3; Rachel Jackson, Woman

Sues Over Lack of Spanish Ballot, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Florida), Nov. z6, 2oo8, at B3; Colleen
Mastony, Kane County Hurriesto Aid Hispanic Voters, CHI. Thn., Sept. 23, 2004, at METRO[.
25 Carl Hulse, By a Vote of 98-o, Senate Approves 25-Year Extension of Voting Right; Act, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2oo6, at Ai6.
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interpreters.16 The letter stated that "[tihe multilingual ballot mandate
encourages the linguistic division of our nation and contradicts the 'Melting
Pot' ideal that has made us the most successful multi-ethnic nation on
earth." 7 In the end, however, Congress renewed the Voting Rights Act of
1965 with a promise of strict enforcement by then President George W
8
Bush.1
In Kentucky, the possibility of having to meet this mandate could
arise sooner rather than later. According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
Kentucky, along with other states in the Southeast, has seen an increase
in its Hispanic/Latino populations. 9 This result mirrors the national trend,
which shows that the Hispanic population will triple from 46.7 million
people in 2008 to 132.8 million people by 2050.30 That number will result
in nearly one in three people inside the United States having a Hispanic
background. 3 Of that one-third, some will likely not speak English as a
native language, driving the percentage of Spanish-speaking voters closer
to the five percent trigger and consequently requiring official documents to
be in the language of the minority.32
At this point, however, Johnson says the Board has not looked into the
possibility.33 She also acknowledges that a change could carry a high price
tag.-' Furthermore, Johnson explains the Board staff believes Kentucky
law prohibits the Board and all of state government from printing
documents in a language other than English.35 This includes not only
26 Charles Babington, GOP Rebellion Stops Voting Rights Act: Complaints Include Bilingual
Ballots andScope ofJustice Dept. Role in South, WASH. POST,June 22, 2oo6, at A7.
27 Id.

28 Todd J. Gillman, VotingLaw Renewed With a Pledge: Bush Vows Strict Enforcement,Although
NEWS, July 28, 2oo6, at 7A.
29 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Opens Charlotte 20o0 Regional
Census Center (Mar. 13, 2oo8), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/
releases/archives/2o I ocensus/o I1624.html.
30 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, An Older and More Diverse Nation by Midcentury
(Aug. 14, 2oo8), available at http:llwww.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releaseslarchives/
population/o I 2496.html.
31 Id.
32 See generally Mar. zoo Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, supranote 23.
33 Jan. 2oo9 Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, supranote 22.
34 Id. Johnson notes the Board has no idea how expensive the changes could be since
the Board has never felt the non-English speaking population was close to the trigger in the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. Mar. 20o0 Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, supra note

Some Are Skeptical, DALLAS MORNING

23.

35 Mar. 20o Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, supra note 23. Johnson points
out, however, that the Board has no formal position since the issue has never come up in
a formal board meeting or before a General Assembly committee. As a result, she believes
more research could help flesh out the statutory restriction but, as for now, she maintains that
"absent a federal mandate, the writings statute would prohibit ballots and registration forms
in languages other than English." Id.
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ballots but also registration forms and any other materials printed by the
36
Commonwealth.
The Board staff bases its English-only printing of all ballots and
registration forms on Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) § 446.060, titled
"Writings; Signature must be at end; To be in English."37 The statute is
organized under Title XLI Laws, Chapter 446, titled "Construction of
Statutes," and states the following:
(1) When the law requires any writing to be signed by a party thereto, it
shall not be deemed to be signed unless the signature is subscribed at the
end or close of the writing.
(2) Every writing contemplated by the laws of this state shall be in the
English language.3"
According to Johnson, the second subsection above restricts local
governments from printing their official documents in any language other
than English. 39 The Kentucky Statute Revision Commission added this
second subsection in 1942 "in lieu of various provisions of former laws
requiring writings to be in the English language."'
To see how this addition came about, one must first briefly examine
the history of Kentucky statutes to understand the evolution of the
Commonwealth's statutory framework. During the latter part of the 1930s,
the Statute Committee of 1936 and its editorial staff "focused on eliminating
from the accumulation of seventy years of legislation those provisions no
longer in force or effect, and restating and compiling the remainder in an
understandable form." 41As a result, the Kentucky Revised Statutes became
the law of the Commonwealth in 1942.42
The relevant inquiry then turns on how the state courts interpret
"writings" under the original statute since the Revised Statutes codified
an older version of the requirement. Kentucky's high court answered
that question in 1922 in Terrell v. Commonwealth.43 A grand jury indicted
Kye Terrell for murder." The only meritorious defense raised on appeal,
according to the court, concerned a grand juror's signature immediately
above the endorsement of the indictment and not immediately following
36 Id.
37 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.o6o (West zoo6); Mar. 201o Telephone Interview with Sarah
Johnson, supra note 23.
38 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.o6o (West 2OO6).
39 Mar. 201o Telephone Interview with Sarah Johnson, supra note 23.
40 I JAMES R. MERRITT, KENTUCKY PRACTICE: PROBATE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 456 (2d
ed. 1984).
41 Reviser's Office, http://www.lrc.ky.gov/statrev/revoff.htm (last visited Jan. 24, zoio).
42 Id.
43 Terrell v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W. 81 (Ky. 1922).
44 Id. at 83.
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as required in then section 468 covering writings in the Commonwealth. 4
Section 468 was the precursor to KRS § 446.060. As stated by the court, "If
S.. the 'writing' referred to in that section, the signing of which is required
to be at its end or close, was intended to include the signing of the name
of the foreman upon the indictment.., there exists some ground for this
extremely technical objection." 46
In its analysis, the court noted that the writing in the statute is required
"to be signed by a party thereto. '47 The court found this language to
encompass not everyday writings, but rather writings "which conferred
rights and imposed obligations upon those who did execute it ... and
includes only such writings as are contractual or quasi contractual in their
nature and to which there must necessarily be parties."' It ruled that this
"writing" was not of a contractual nature; as a result, it did not come under
the statute concerning writings, a precursor to KRS § 446.060. 49
Kentucky's high court had previously stated in 1920 that when the
General Assembly
has used a word in a statute in one sense and with one meaning, and
subsequently uses the same word in legislating upon the same subjectmatter, it will be understood as using it in the same sense, unless there be
something in the context or the nature of things to indicate that it intended
a different meaning thereby.-"
The Terrell holding regarding writings came in 1922; therefore, it must be
presumed that the 1942 General Assembly knew KRS § 446.060 covered
only the writings stated by the court in Terrellv. Commonwealth. As a result,
when the General Assembly passed the Revised Statutes in 1942, it
presumably knew that putting the English "writing" requirement in the
statute dealt solely with contracts as defined in Terrell.Thus, the "writing"
statute covers only contracts or quasi contracts based on the circumstances
and context. As a result, the writings contemplated in KRS § 446.060 deal
only with those you would see in business settings requiring the receipt or
deprivation of current or future rights.
The GeneralAssembly appears to understand this proposition through its
requirements that corporate documents," documents outlining alternatives

45 Id.
46
47
48
49
50

Id.
Id. at 84 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 84-85.

Commonwealth, by Byars v. Alford's Ex'r, 2 18 S.W 721,

51 See Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 27 1B. 1-200(5) (West 2oo6).

722

(Ky.

1920).
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to abortion and the characteristics of the fetus,"2 and insurance documents53
be filed in English. This understanding becomes more apparent when
considering recent attempts to change the official language statute.
In 1984 the General Assembly passed, and the governor signed into
law, a bill authorizing an official state language. s' KRS § 2.013, titled "State
language," states that "English is designated as the official state language
of Kentucky."55 The General Assembly, however, has generally treated this
provision as a largely symbolic statute. It is placed in the statutes alongside
others detailing the state seal5 6 and state flag 7 and making the cardinal the
state bird of Kentucky 8 and the gray squirrel the state wild animal game
species.5 9 As a result, representatives in the General Assembly attempted to
pass a bill in 2007 to amend the statute by providing "that unless otherwise
authorized or provided by law, all documents produced or utilized by
the Commonwealth or its political subdivisions shall be in the English
language only." 6 The bill, incidentally, never came out of the House State
Government Committee and died without any true action taken on it.6 1
At least one other court agrees that an official language statute like
KRS § 2.013 cannot prohibit other languages from use in ballots or voter
registration forms. Considering the "English as the official language"
statute in Illinois, the Seventh Circuit held that it did not prohibit local
governments from giving voting assistance in Spanish. 62 The court also
held a provision of the Illinois State Constitution requiring that "all official
writings ... be conducted, preserved and published in no other than the
English language" as not prohibitive of bilingual assistance. 63 In doing so,
the Seventh Circuit noted various state and city agencies publishing and
providing services in Spanish. 64
Though Kentucky does not offer voting materials in Spanish, it does
offer other services in Spanish. These include materials on how to quit
52 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.

53 See Ky.
54 See Ky.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 311.725(2) (West 2oo6).
§ 304.14-4350) (West 2oo9).

REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.013 (West 2oo6).

55 Id.

56 See id. § 2.020.
57 See id. § 2.030.
58 See id. § 2.o8o.
59 See id. § 2.085.
6o H.R. 12, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2007), available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/
record/o7rs/hbl 2.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2oo).
61 Kentucky Legislature, o7RS HB12, http:llwww.lrc.ky.gov/record/o7rs/hbl2.htm
(last visited Mar. 17, 2oio) (explaining the legislative history of the bill, showing the House
introduced the bill on January 2, 2007, before sending it to the House State Government
Committee with no further action noted).
62 See Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 490 F2d 575, 578 (7 th Cir. 1973).
63 Id. at 577 n.i.
64 Seeid. at 577.
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smoking, 6 family rights documents regarding state-provided therapy,' and
even seminars in Spanish regarding fair housing. 67 These examples only
further the argument that the English-only requirement in KRS § 446.060
does not apply as broadly as stated by the Board staff. Furthermore, a
voter who cannot read English may still receive assistance in voting at the
polls and the statute does not prohibit non-English materials, much like
the Illinois statute. 68 When dealing with the Illinois statute, the Seventh
Circuit held the "official language" statute did not prohibit bilingual voting
materials. 69 Courts of local jurisdiction, in Kentucky and the Sixth Circuit,
would likely hold similarly. KRS § 446.060, therefore, cannot be interpreted
to require all state documents to appear only in the English language.

II.

VIOLATION OF THE KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION

"All elections shall be free and equal."
Kentucky Bill of Rights, Kentucky Constitution § 670
While not in the Federal Constitution, the Kentucky Constitution
does establish a right to free and equal elections.71 Thus, if the local courts
refused to find a misinterpretation of the English writings requirement or
the General Assembly amended the official language statute as attempted
in 2007, this outright requirement would violate the Bill of Rights in the
Kentucky Constitution. As stated above, section six of the Kentucky
Constitution mandates that "[aill elections shall be free and equal."7 " The
provision appears in Kentucky's Bill of Rights, which provides for free and
equal elections so "[t/hat the great and essential principles of liberty and
free government may be recognized and established."73
In reviewing statutes for constitutionality, Kentucky courts do not
consider "the wisdom, need or appropriateness of legislation, nor the
purposes motivating it," but rather they analyze the meaning of the law
65 See Be a Quitter Campaign--Spanish Version (zoo6), avaliable at http://chfs.ky.gov/
NR/rdonlyres/D2Co25 i-A 9 D5-44 3 3 --84Fo-EAB848AE4928/o/BeAQuitterCampaignSpani
shBrochure.pdf.
66 See A Summary of Family Rights--Spanish Version (2005), avaliable at http://chfs.
ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/64BAio5o-9C7A-494B-9z5 1-97B2FCBzAF iE/o/Form ASummaryof
FamilyRightsrevioo6o5Spanishversion.pdf.
67 See Press Release, Ky. Comm'n on Human Rights, A Free, in Spanish, "Know Your
Fair Housing Rights" Seminar (July 16, 2oo8), available at http://migration.kentucky.gov/
Newsroom/kchr/Know+Your+Fair+Housing+Rights+presentation+7-ao-o8.htm.
68 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.255 (West 2006).
69 See Kusper, 490 F.2d at 577-78.
70 Ky. CONST. § 6.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Ky. CONST. (Introduction to the Bill of Rights).
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and the constitutionality of that meaning.74 In doing so, the court will hold
the statute valid "unless it clearly offends the limitations and prohibitions
of the [Clonstitution, within which is everything contrary to the policy and
genius of our form of government."7 " The burden of showing that a law
does not pass constitutional muster lies with the person challenging the
law's validity in the first place.76 If the court finds the challenger has met
his burden," section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution requires that "all
laws contrary [to the Bill of Rights], or contrary to this Constitution, shall
78
be void.
If a statute, therefore, removes from Kentucky citizens the ability to have
a free and equal election, Kentucky courts must hold it unconstitutional.
The obvious question, however, centers on the meaning of "free and
equal."7 9 Kentucky's highest court has held that "[tihe right to ... vote and
be voted for is a constitutional right."" The court later refined this right by
stating the following:
[A]n election is free and equal within the meaning of the Constitution only
when it is public and open to all qualified electors alike; when every voter
has the same right as any other voter; when each voter under the law has the
right to cast his ballot and have it honestly counted; when the regulation of
the right to exercise the franchise does not deny the franchise itself or make
it so difficult as to amount to a denial; and when sno constitutional right of
the qualified elector is subverted or denied him. 1
Of the above-mentioned criteria, the one most relevant to the present issue
is whether the regulation denies the vote itself or makes it so difficult as to
amount to a denial. Since election documents include not only the ballot
but other materials like the voter registration card, this Note will look at
both to determine whether requiring these documents in English "clearly
''8s
offends the limitations and prohibitions of the [Cjonstitution.
A. The Kentucky RegistrationForm
Kentucky's high court has held that "the provisions of registration laws
must be reasonable, uniform, and impartial, and must not deny nor abridge
74 Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 165 S.W.2d 8zo, 823 (Ky. 1942).
75 Id.

76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Ky. CONST. § 26.

79 Id. § 6.
8o Asher v.Arnett, 132 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Ky. 1939).
81 Queenan v. Russell, 339 S.W.zd 475,477 (Ky. i96o) (citing Asher v. Amnett,
772, 775 (Ky. 1939)).
82 Johnson, 165 S.W.2d at 823.

132 S.W.2d
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the constitutional right of suffrage, nor unnecessarily impede the right."'
The court stated it would hold void any regulations that violated these
guidelines.' Since requiring registration forms in English-only would be a
uniform and impartial requirement, this Note will not analyze this factor.8 5
Everyone would have to fill out the same form, and the requirements do
not change from person to person. This leaves only the reasonableness
requirement and the denial of the right of suffrage as potential violations
by an English-only requirement for voter registration forms.
1.Reasonableness.-Thepurpose of section six of the Kentucky Constitution,
according to Kentucky's high court, is to require that "the Legislature in
enacting registration laws ... has not the power to enact such a law as will
add to the voter a qualification necessary to exercise the right of suffrage."
As a result, if the registration law unreasonably restricts the ability of a
potential voter to cast a ballot by adding qualifications necessary to vote, a
Kentucky court will strike it down.
The requirement to register as a voter provides a good place to start
when considering whether a registration statute unreasonably adds
qualifications necessary to vote. While Kentucky case law has recognized
the registration requirement as an added qualification, the courts have
held that the "rule of common sense and reason" allows the legislature to
add this qualification, provided it does not deny the "constitutional right
of the elector to vote.""s In stating that the registration requirement itself
did not present an unreasonable added qualification, the court quoted
North Carolina law and stated that the purpose of a registration law "is to
facilitate the exercise of the right of the ballot, and not to defeat it."88 As a
result, Kentucky's highest court has also held, in regards to the registration
process, that "when such laws add to the qualifications prescribed by the
Constitution, or impose unreasonable conditions of the exercise of the
privilege of voting.... courts can interfere."8 9
83 Perkins v. Lucas, 246 S.W 150, 154 (Ky. 1922).
84 Id.
85 The author recognizes that an English-only requirement for registration forms could
show partiality towards those that can read English and exclude certain populations, like
recent immigrants, which could be considered race-based discrimination and a violation of
equal protection. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, has held that "[p]roof of
racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause." Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (977). It is
hard to imagine the Board would take intentionally racially discriminatory action in this day
and age. Further discussion of other potential equal protection violations, however, can be
found in a later section of this Note. See infra Part 11.
86 Perkins, 246 S.W. at 153.
87 Id. at i54.
88 Id. (quoting People ex rel. Van Bokheln v. Canady, 73 N.C. 198, 223 (N.C. 1875)).
89 Commonwealth v. McClelland, 83 Ky. 686, 691 (Ky. 1886).
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Kentucky courts, therefore, should focus on whether the Board's
observance of the English-only requirement is reasonable in facilitation
of the voting process while ensuring it does not defeat Kentucky citizens'
ability to vote. The Board could classify the registration requirement and
the English-only requirement it applies to the forms as reasonable in an
effort to protect against voter fraud. The Board could also argue that the
requirement is reasonable because it fosters administrative efficiency by
not requiring registration forms in the many different languages that will
eventually be spoken in this country as more immigrants come from places
other than Spanish-speaking countries. Lastly, the Board could justify
this requirement by pointing to the costs associated with preparing and
distributing forms that few people would use.
While Kentucky courts have little case law on what it would consider
reasonable, the United States Supreme Court has handled the issue under
a due process analysis. The Court in Meyer v. Nebraska9t o established, and
the Supreme Court continues to follow, the following test for a due process
violation: "liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting
the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state to
effect." 91 In applying this test, however, the Supreme Court has recognized
that while efficiency can provide a legitimate state interest, "the [Federal]
Bill of Rights in general ...[was] designed to protect the fragile values
of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy," 9 thus requiring a greater showing to prove reasonableness.
Applying this standard, the state will have a hard time showing that
this requirement is a reasonable means to achieve efficiency, especially in
today's age. The state would have no difficulty finding translators to make
the voter registration cards multilingual. It also could avoid printing costs
by making the applications available online. Notably, the Board already
makes the application available on its Web site to print, complete, and send
in for processing. 93 It seems unreasonable not to allow this option to those
who struggle with English by simply translating it and posting the variation
on its Web site.
Furthermore, the English-only requirement adds a qualification to
voting as forbidden by Kentucky law, namely an implicit requirement to be
able to read and write English. Kentucky courts, however, could struggle
in determining whether this requirement "clearly offends the limitations

90 Meyer v. Nebraska, z62 U.S. 390 (1923).
91 Id. at 399-400; see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 452 (199o); New Motor
Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1348 (1977).
92 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,656 (1972).
93 Kentucky: State Board of Elections-Register to Vote, http://www.elect.ky.gov/
register.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
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and prohibitions of the [C]onstitution," 94 since the registration law does not
explicitly impose it. As with many of the issues involved in the analysis,
this determination could prove a close call.
2. Denial of the Right to Vote.-In dealing with registration laws challenged
under the "free and equal" portion of the Kentucky Constitution, the
Kentucky Supreme Court has stated that "[e]lections are free and equal
only when all who possess the requisite qualifications are afforded a
reasonable opportunity to vote without being molested or intimidated." 9
These words should be used to provide some guidance to the requirement
that the registration process "not deny nor abridge the constitutional right
of suffrage, nor unnecessarily impede the right."96
Kentucky courts have held that force and/or intimidation are not
necessary to show a vote so difficult as to amount to a denial. 97 As a result,
non-English speakers could make an argument that the inability to read
the documents and register to vote effectively denies them the opportunity
to cast a ballot on election day. This argument, however, could again prove
a close call.
As stated above, the purpose of registration laws is to ensure that
only qualified voters have the opportunity to vote. Though one could
argue that the English-only nature of the registration form impedes the
right of suffrage for those citizens who cannot read English, non-English
speaking voters do not differ from illiterate voters. Illiterate voters can
request assistance to vote in the same way that non-English speakers can
request help at the polls. Just as importantly, no successful challenges to
the registration statutes by an illiterate voter exist at this time. As a result,
a court would likely require the state to commit a more egregious action in
addition to refusing to print ballots in other languages to find it "molest[ed]
or intimidate[d]" non-English speaking voters. 98
3. Policy behind a Change.-Regardless of the outcome of any potential
challenges to the restriction on non-English language materials, the rationale
for changing this policy goes straight to the rationale of the registration
statutes. The legislature wants to ensure "free and equal" elections, as
required by the Kentucky Constitution, by not allowing fraudulent votes. 99
Refusing to allow bilingual voter registration forms, however, could lead to
increased voter fraud. The lack of bilingual registration documents presents
an intimidating impediment to someone who cannot read the English
94
95
96
97
98
99

Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 165 S.W.zd 82o, 823 (Ky.
Commonwealth v. McClelland, 83 Ky. 686, 693 (Ky. 1886).
Perkins v. Lucas, 246 S.W. 150, 154 (Ky. 1922).
Hocker v. Pendleton, 39 S.W. 250, 250 (Ky. 1897).
Md~lelland,83 Ky. at 693.
Ky. CONST. § 6.

1942).
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language to understand what they are signing. At that point, another person
must translate the document. The existence of a middleman inevitably
leads to questions regarding possible voter fraud. As the illiterate person
cannot fully understand the writing on the registration card, unnecessary
confrontations can occur and, just as importantly, questions may arise
regarding the true motives behind the registration, a problem highlighted
in recent challenges to registrations by groups like ACORN. 1°° This issue
will likely be litigated as the registration group community grows, and
courts will have to make a determination regarding the validity of the
registration. In the end, the Kentucky courts should resolve the issue in
favor of whatever position protects the integrity of the "free and equal"
election by completely informing the electorate of the voting process in
whatever language necessary.
B. Kentucky Ballots
In Hockerv. Pendleton,0 1 Kentucky's high court set aside an election due
to a large proportion of electors not having the chance to vote because of "a
failure of the officers to supply ballots, booths, stencils, etc."102 In the later
case of Smith v. Kelly, 103 the court stated that "if there existed any statute
...
as to deprive a large portion of [voters] of a reasonable opportunity
to cast their ballots, the statute would be unconstitutional and void."'1'
Using the Hockerv. Pendleton rationale regarding the deprivation of a large
percentage of voters of the opportunity to vote, the court in Smith v. Kelly
ruled that not having enough sufficiently prepared precincts for people to
vote violates the guarantee of "free and equal" elections in the Kentucky
Bill of Rights.10l
Thus, Kentucky courts must consider whether the failure to provide
Spanish language assistance results in a failure to supply materials required
to vote. If this is the case, the courts must then consider whether a large
portion of voters are being deprived of a reasonable opportunity to cast
ballots as a result of the provision. As stated in the Eastern District of
Louisiana, "[I]f an illiterate is entitled to vote, he is entitled to assistance
at the polls that will make his vote meaningful."'06 The court held absurd
the "notion that an illiterate has the right [to] pull the lever of a voting

ioo Dan Mckay, GOP Lawyer Says Intent Was to Invesigate ACORN, Not Scare Voters,
J., Nov. 4, 2008, at Di.
ioi Hocker, 39 S.W. 250.

ALBUQUERQUE

102 Id. at 250.

io3 Smith v. Kelly, 58 S.W.2d 621 (Ky. 1933).
1o4 Id. at 622.
io5 Id. at 623.
io6 United States v. Louisiana, 265 F Supp. 703, 708 (E.D. La. 1966).
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machine, but not the right to know for whom he pulls the lever." 17
Yet, even if it is conceded that Kentucky must make changes, it does
not necessarily follow that the Commonwealth and local governments must
provide materials in Spanish to ensure a "fair and equal" election under
the Kentucky Constitution. The Supreme Court of California overturned
a former section of the California Constitution requiring that voters have
the ability to read English, but it refused to require a "bilingual electoral
system."'08 In doing so, it recognized the state's interest in avoiding the
"cost and administrative complexity," which includes the "expense of
translating, printing and distributing ballots, sample ballots, and ballot
Thus, the California Supreme
pamphlets ... in both English and Spanish." 109
Court held that particular section of its state constitution a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment but refused to
require California to change its method of voting." 0
In the decision, the court explicitly held that overturning that section
of the California Constitution does not imply that the state must provide
perfect voting conditions in allowing for an equal opportunity for all
qualified citizens to vote."' The court thought that Spanish-speaking
voters could prepare by studying sample ballots with other English
speakers, have ballots translated in their own communities, and receive
electoral commentary by Spanish news media."'
The California court's approach would not translate in Kentucky,
however, because the same support systems existing in California for the
Spanish-speaking community, 113 such as an extensive Spanish news media,
does not exist in the Commonwealth. Lexington is the second largest city
in Kentucky and is referred to by those outside the Commonwealth as a
"modern city with a passion for history."' 14 The local Hispanic population
107 Id.

io8 Castro v. State, 466 P.zd
1O9

244,

257 (Cal. 1970).

Id.

iio Id. at 257-58.
iii Id.
I12 Id. at 258.

13 See id.at 254-55 ("[Elight Spanish language newspapers are published in Los
Angeles County, two of which are published daily, the remainder at weekly intervals. Nine
additional Spanish language newspapers which are published elsewhere in the United States,
in Mexico, or in South America also circulate in Los Angeles County. Eleven Spanish language
magazines are available, two of which, Grafica and La Raza, are published in Los Angeles and
are devoted primarily to discussion of national and local political affairs. The nine remaining
include Spanish translations of Life (Life en Espanol) and Readers' Digest (Selecciones).").
Another listing of media in Los Angeles shows five television stations, and one radio station
delivering the news in Spanish. Los Angeles California Local News Media-Los Angeles
Newspapers, Magazines, Radio & TV Stations, http://www.mondotimes.com/i/world/us/5/242
(last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
114 Jessica Armstrong, The Bluegrass State Kentucky Is Rich in Legend, Tradition, Natural
Beauty, CHI. Tam., Nov. 1z, 1989, at C 16.
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nearly tripled between 1990 and 2000 from 5765 to 16,479.115 One local
expert posited that the growth resulted from the large number of Latinos
that came to work on the horse farms and tobacco fields in the 1970s.16This
growth, coupled with a rise in business, prompted the Kentucky Chamber
of Commerce to hold a meeting in 2009 on the possibility of forming a
17
statewide Hispanic Business Council.'
The general community has not been as quick to respond. In Lexington,
the first workplace Spanish courses only began appearing within the last
twenty years.' 8 The first and only widely-circulated Spanish newspaper
in Lexington, La Voz, began printing less than ten years ago." 9 Even more
indicative of the problem is the story of a Honduran man sent to prison
for murder in Kentucky after an "interpreter translated the word 'life' as
'libra,' or 'scale."' 20
1 In 2002, the man had his conviction for murder reduced
to reckless homicide and was released from prison.' Current Kentucky
Supreme Court Justice Mary Noble wrote, when handling the case, that
"[o]ut of ignorance, all assumed one who speaks Spanish or is born in a
Spanish-speaking world can interpret .... This case reveals that this is a
false assumption."'
Accordingly, while Kentucky's number of Spanish-speaking citizens
continues to grow, the willingness of the overall community to provide the
type of support relied upon in California 2 3 has yet to materialize. Thus, the

115 Robert Schoenberger, Hispanic Businesses Gaining Momentum in Louisville Area,
(Louisville, Ky.), Mar. 22, 2oo6, at IA.
I6 Id.
117 Press Release, Kentucky Chamber of Commerce, Meeting Planned to Explore
Formation of Kentucky Hispanic Business Council (Jan. 5, 2009) (on file with author). The
Chamber cancelled the first meeting due to an ice storm that hit the area but later held followup meetings. E-mail from Jessica Fletcher, Communications Manager, Kentucky Chamber of
Commerce, to Mark Flores, Author (Jan. 30, 2009, 09:05 EST) (on file with author). While it
determined there was not enough interest to form a statewide Kentucky Hispanic Business
Council, the Chamber continues to "[encourage] local chambers to create local synergies with
the Hispanic business community, and several have had success-specifically Bowling Green
and Greater Louisville[,] Inc." Id.
118 See Laura Oppenheimer, Businesses Offering Spanishfor Workers: As HispanicPopulation
Grows, Need Increases, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, July 5, zooo, at AI.
S19 Risa Brim, PublisherPlansMonthly Issue of La Voz, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, May
19, 2001, at BI. At the time, it was reported La Voz was the only Spanish-language paper in
Kentucky. Id. This is no longer the case. AlDia now serves the Louisville market. La Voz, Al
Dia Combine Resources, Bus. FIRST OF LOUISVILLE, Nov, 19, 2oo9, http://Iouisville.bizjournals.
cornflouisville/stories/2009/1 i/t6/daily39.html. Both La Voz and AlDia publish bi-weekly and
print 2o,ooo copies combined per publication. Id.
120 Jay Root, No Laughing Matter: Translation Snafus Can Offend, Cause Lawsuits, Even
HamperWar on Terror,HOUSTON CHRON., June 23, 2002, at A24.
COURIER-JOURNAL

121

Id.

122

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

123

Castro v.State, 466 P.zd

244,

257-58 (Cal. 1970).
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rationale provided by the California Supreme Court is not applicable to
Kentucky. Though the few Spanish language papers could translate ballots
and initiatives in their publications, the opportunity for commentary
through the media is almost non-existent. With limited Spanish language
media in Kentucky, the possibility of leading ill-informed voters to the
booth is a legitimate concern and could lead to corruption or even fraud.
The possibility of corruption and fraud does not afford anyone a "free and
equal" election. As such, voters must have the materials needed to cast an
appropriate ballot.
If a court were to recognize that Kentucky needs to require materials
in Spanish, the court would still have to find that the absence of bilingual
materials would deprive a large percentage of citizens of their right to vote,
as stated in Hocker v. Pendleton.114 The court in Hocker gives no guidance
as to precisely what number would constitute a large percentage. A look
at the Voting Rights Act of 1965, however, can provide a reasonable start.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 uses the threshold of more than 10,000
voting age citizens of a political subdivision or more than five percent of
the voting age citizens of a state or political subdivision as the trigger for
federal requirements dealing with language.2 5 Since federal provisions
would kick in at this point anyway, a Kentucky court would likely have no
problem agreeing with the numbers stated in the Voting Rights Act of 1965
as "any large proportion of the electors"1 6 being deprived of their vote. If
a Kentucky court did agree with the federal provision numbers and the
situation remained unchanged, the Board would need to provide materials
in a language other than English to ensure that it does not violate either
section six of the Kentucky Constitution or the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
III.

EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

A. Kentucky and FederalEqualProtection of ConstitutionalRights
The Kentucky court should also find that a restriction on all other
languages besides English violates citizens' rights to equal protection
as provided in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution" 7 and as provided in the Kentucky Constitution.1 18 The
Kentucky Constitution statcs that "[t]he General Assembly shall not pass
local or special acts concerning any of the following subjects, or for any of
124 Hocker v. Pendleton, 39 S.W. 250, 250 (Ky. 1897).
125 42 U.S.C. §§

1973aa-1a(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)-(IIl) to 1973aa-Ia(c) (zoo6).

126 Hocker, 39 S.W. at 250.
127 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
128 Ky CONST. § 59; see also Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Ky. 1985) (discussing
section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution and a comparison to the Equal Protection Clause of
the Federal Constitution).
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the following purposes, namely:... [t]o regulate the limitation of civil or
criminal causes."1 9 It also states, in earlier sections, the following:
All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and
inalienable rights .... 1s

Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of
freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority."'
All men, when they form a social compact, are equal; and no grant of
exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges shall be made to any
man or set of men, except in consideration of public services .... 132
When put together, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that these
provisions of the Kentucky Constitution "embrace the [Elqual [P]rotection
[C]lause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 33 As a result, Kentucky's highest
court has used the same tests as applied by the United States Supreme
Court, using the Supreme Court's precedent to determine if a statute
violates Kentucky's version of equal protection.' 3 If the statute violates
Kentucky's version of equal protection, it also violates the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
In Bush v. Gore,'35 arguably the most famous equal protection voting
case, the Supreme Court of the United States stated that "[wihen the state
legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to
vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental." 31 6This continues the
Court's policy of ensuring that once the legislature gives the right to vote,
"lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection
37
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."1
In Kentucky, KRS § 118.425 governs the election of "electors of President
129 KY CONST. § 59.

130 Id. § i.
131 Id.§2.
132 Id. § 3.

133 Tabler,704 S.W.2d at 183.
134 See Johnson v. Dixon, 501 S.W.2d 256, 257-58 (Ky. 1973); Beacon Liquors v. Martin,
131 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Ky. 1939).
135 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2ooo). The author acknowledges that the Supreme Court
of the United States held that its consideration of the equal protection violation in Bush v.
Gore was "limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities." Id. at iog. Consequently, the opinion in
Bush v. Gore does not answer the question of when a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
relating to election law has occurred. Id. at 1o4. Thus, this Note will only cite to Bush v. Gore
for the purpose of demonstrating the fundamental nature of the right to vote and when the
Court would allow a voter to raise an equal protection question. For an interesting discussion
of this topic, see generally Adam Cohen, Editorial, Has Bush v. Gore Become the Case ThatMust
Not Be Named?, N.Y. 'TMES, Aug. 15, 2oo6, at Ai 8.
136 Bush, 531 U.S. at 1O4.

137 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
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and Vice President of the United States."' The procedure requires the
Board to meet and certify which candidates received the highest number
of votes.' 39 The certification of votes "shall constitute a determination
that the electors nominated by that party have been elected."'" As such,
citizen voters indirectly decide the selection of the electors and how they
will vote. Because Kentucky allows the citizenry to participate in the vote
for President, equal protection standards apply, including those associated
with the First Amendment.
B. RequiringEnglish-Only Violates FirstAmendment Rights-Restrictingthe
Documents
The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates First Amendment
protections;14 therefore, state and local regulations dealing with prohibitions
of speech will require a "stricter standard of review"'141 than the more
43
lenient rational basis review applied in ordinary equal protection analysis.
As stated in Carey v. Brown,'" "When government regulation discriminates
among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection
Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial
state interests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws
must be carefully scrutinized."'' 41 In 2007 the Alaska Supreme Court
declared a provision of an English-only statute requiring the government
use English for all of its functions unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment as a result of the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of
First Amendment rights protected by Alaska's state constitution and the
United States Constitution.' 46 The Kentucky Constitution, like the United
States Constitution, has a freedom of speech amendment built into its Bill
of Rights as well. 47 As stated above, the Kentucky Supreme Court has
held the United States Equal Protection Clause equally applicable at the
state and local levels via the Kentucky Constitution.'" The United States
Supreme Court has also discussed the fundamental rights of freedom
138 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § I18.425(6) (West Supp. 2oog).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.75 (I973) (citing Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 4o8 U.S. 92, 101 (1972)).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 34 n.73.
I44 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (98o).
145 Id. at 461-62 (citing Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98--99, ioi).
146 Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 193-94, 215 (Alaska
2007).
147 Ky. CONST. § 8.
148 Seesupra notes 87-89.
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of speech and of the press as follows: "[Fireedom of speech and of the
press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment
by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'
protected by the [D]ue [Pirocess [C]lause of the Fourteenth Amendment
' 14 9
from impairment by the States."
This Note, therefore, will use federal jurisprudence in analyzing First
Amendment law. Reasoning similar to that used by the Alaska Supreme
Court interpreting the United States Constitution and the First Amendment
will serve as a guide as this Note employs United States Supreme Court
decisions in the analysis.
In Alaska, citizens approved a statute that "require[d] the state to use
English in all government functions and actions."' 150 The statute was later
codified and interpreted as "[requiring] the use of English by all government
officers and employees in all government functions and actions at the state
and local levels."15' Proponents of the statute argued that the Supreme
Court allowed state governments to "determine the content, form, and
manner of its own speech."15 As stated by the Court in Rosenbergerv.Rector
& Visitors of the University of Virginia,153 "[Wihen the State is the speaker, it
may make content-based choices." '-4
The Alaska Supreme Court, however,
held that the "state-as-speaker" doctrine could not apply as broadly as
it did in the English-only statute. It stated that the "doctrine govern[ed]
communications made by a defined group of government employees or
'
agents in the pursuit of narrowly-focused policy goals."155
Here, the communication at issue includes voting materials and voter
registration cards. The policy goals involved are likely similar to the state's
"professed desire to avoid the cost and administrative complexity entailed
in providing a bilingual electoral system" referred to by the California
Supreme Court in Castro v. State.5 6 The communications are also made
by a defined group of government employees. As a result, government
entities, such as the Board, may have an interest that satisfies heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court of the
United States, however, has held that the type of review will depend on the
restriction imposed by the challenged state action and its impact.' 7 Justice
149 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,666 (1925).
15o Kritz, 170 P.3d at 187.
151 Id. at 197.
152 Id. at 198 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (zooi); Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (zooo); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Rust v. Sullivan, 5oo U.S. 173 (I991)).
153 Rosenberger,515 U.S. 819.
154 Id. at 833.
155 Krtz, 170 P3d at 199.
156 Castro v. State, 466 P.2d z44 (Cal. 1970).
157 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 294 (2004).
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Scalia, writing for the majority in Vieth v. Jubelirer,stated that "[an action
that triggers a heightened level of scrutiny for one claim may receive a
very different level of scrutiny for a different claim because the underlying
rights, and consequently constitutional harms, are not comparable."'" 8
In the past, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of state
restrictions on the appropriation of federal funds for use in abortions' 1 9
and the distribution of funds, without regard to the type of speech, for
student organizations. 160 The harms associated with these examples were
financial and hardly involved fundamental rights. Kentucky's high court,
however, has long recognized the right to vote as a fundamental right,16 '
and the United States Supreme Court has "made clear that a citizen has a
constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis
with other citizens in the jurisdiction... [and that] the purpose of [a voting]
restriction and the assertedly overriding interests served by it must meet
close constitutional scrutiny."16 As a result, a more heightened level of
scrutiny than that which applies in typical state restriction challenges must
apply to state actions that take away a citizen's constitutionally protected
rights under the Kentucky and United States Constitutions.
The problem with Kentucky's approach to the English-only statute
is that it completely bans local county and municipal governments from
communicating in another language, regardless of the local governments'
preferences. This policy also infringes on the citizens' First Amendment
rights. The United States Supreme Court held that "[t]he right of freedom
of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but
16
the right to distribute, the right to receive, [and] the right to read."'
Essentially, the right to receive information depends on the existence of
an "able and willing [speaker] to provide them with information about the
government." 164 If Kentucky courts hold that the English-only stance on
158 Id.
159 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178-81 (I99I).
16o Bd. of Regents of the Univ. ofWis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 220-22 (2ooo).
161 Chrisman v. Bruce, 62 Ky. (i. Duv) 63, 67 (Ky. 1863) ("[Voting] is [a]fundamental
right; all other rights, civil and political, depend on the free exercise of this one, and any
material impairment of it is, to that extent, a subversion of our political system. Hence the care
with which any invasion of this right, from every possible source, has been guarded against.
The [Kentucky Constitution] declares that 'all elections shall be free and equal;' that 'the
privilege of free suffrage shall be supported by laws regulating elections, and prohibiting,
under adequate penalties, all undue influence thereon from power, bribery, tumult, or other
improper practices."').
162 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (citing Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419,
42 1-22 (1970)) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

163 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
164 Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 200 (Alaska 2007)
(citing Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F3d 920, 940-42 (9th Cir. 1994); In re
Initiative Petition No. 366,46 P3d 123, 127-28 (Okla. 2002); Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984,997-98

(Ariz. 1998)).
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documents is constitutional, then there will be no willing and able speaker.
As a result, the rights of citizens to have documents in languages other than
English will necessarily hinge on a willingness from the government and
the constitutionality of the ban on non-English language documents.
The United States Supreme Court will apply "the most exacting
scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential
burdens upon speech because of its content."' 6 This content-based
analysis requires "that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial
state interests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws
must be carefully scrutinized."' 66 Other restrictions, like time, place, or
manner restrictions, will receive an intermediate level of scrutiny.161 The
Supreme Court has explained this level of scrutiny as follows:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.' 6'
As a result, a court must first decide the type of restriction imposed before
ruling on its constitutionality.
The Supreme Court explained that "the 'principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality ...is whether the government has adopted
a regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the
message it conveys."' ' 69 The Court stated, however, that it will not require
a showing of a content-based purpose to classify a restriction as "content
based."'' 0 It justified that stance as follows:
As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech
from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are
content-based. By contrast, laws that confer benefits or impose burdens
on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most
instances content-neutral. 7'
The importance of this distinction could mean the difference between
165 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,

642 (1994).

166 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,461-62 (98o) (citing Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 98-99, 101 (1972)).
167 TurnerBroad.Sys., 512 U.S. at 642.
168 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968).
169 TurnerBroad.Sys., 512 U.S. at 642 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989)) (ellipsis and brackets in original).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 643 (citations omitted).
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winning and losing the case since content-based restrictions require strict
scrutiny, which "almost always results in invalidation."' 72 The Court's
rationale centers on "the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to
advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or
information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than
persuasion." 13 Accordingly, the true test comes in determining whether the
court will consider the ban on non-English documents a content-based or
content-neutral restriction.
At its purest form, the restriction set forth by the Board staff banning all
non-English content in state documents does not necessarily fall into the
content-based restriction category. The English-only requirement does
not restrict the names or words used on the ballot because of the message
those words communicate. In fact, the Board's Voter Information Guide
states that "voters who ask for voting assistance due to . . . an inability to
read English may request voting assistance at the polls on election day."1"4
In essence, the Board has no desire to restrict the content of the message
but rather wants the content to be communicated in any way necessary. As
a result, a court will not apply a strict scrutiny standard to this English-only
requirement, but will instead apply a much less stringent standard.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that while the government
will have a difficult time restricting content, its "cases make equally clear
...
that reasonable 'time, place and manner' regulations may be necessary to
further significant governmental interests, and are permitted." 75 As a result,
if the Kentucky court were to hold the restriction to be content-neutral,
the ban on non-English language documents in the Commonwealth would
still fail under intermediate scrutiny.7 6 This level of scrutiny requires a
substantial governmental interest, such as savings and efficiency in
governmental operations, and a restriction that is no greater than necessary
to further that interest.'77
The United States Supreme Court has held that "when we enter the
realm of 'strict judicial scrutiny,' there can be no doubt that 'administrative
convenience' is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dictates
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 294 (2004).
173 TurnerBroad. Sys., 512 U.S. at64I.
174 Kentucky: State Board of Elections-Voter Information Guide, http:I/elect.ky.govl
registrationinfo/infoguide.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 201o).
172

175 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (citing Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 320-21 (1968); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,46-48 (1966);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 553-54 (1965); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 398
(1953); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
575-76(1941)).
176 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968) (describing when a government
regulation satisfies intermediate scrutiny).
177 Id.
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constitutionality."' 8 The Court also held, however, that administrative
convenience does bear some importance. 79 As a result, though not
sufficient to overcome strict scrutiny review, governmental efficiency
and savings could serve as substantial interests that satisfy intermediate
scrutiny review and justify a ban on non-English language documents.
Kentucky's high court, however, will likely require more than governmental
efficiency and savings for the ban to pass intermediate scrutiny review,
especially considering the new technologies used in voting equipment. In
the past, the Commonwealth's older voting machines would have required
switching ballots on voting machines, printing documents in non-English
languages, and providing costly translation services. 180 In the electronic
age, however, many voting machines have ballots that appear on the screen
based on a code number issued at the ballot box. Though they may need
to be programmed, the added expense of such programming will likely
be minimal. Furthermore, the state does not necessarily have to print
these documents for citizens anymore, as the ability to download them
onto citizens' home personal computers becomes more available through
high-speed Internet access spreading across the country.' The translation
would cause the government to incur only a one-time fee. The savings and
efficiency interest, therefore, would decrease as technology advances.
The second part of the test requiring that the restriction be no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest 8 also presents problems
for the government. This restriction, if accepted, will require that all
government documents, including government bills, court documents, and
even documents from schools, libraries, and county hospitals, be printed
in English to remain content-neutral. In Lexington, Kentucky, there
are a number of bilingual schools that teach in Spanish and Japanese. 83
178 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973).
179 Id.
I8o Seventeen of Kentucky's I2O counties still use the older ELECTronic 1242 voting
machine accounting for 455 of the 7069 voting machines in the Commonwealth. Ky. STATE
BD.OF ELECTIONS, VOTING EQUIPMENT USED BY EACH COUNTY (2oo9), http://www.electky.

gov (follow "Voting Equipment by County" hyperlink; follow "'here' fora list by machine
type" hyperlink). The ELECTronic 1242 stands about 6 feet tall and includes a large printout
of the ballot on top of a panel of buttons which trigger a light next to the name the voter
selects. ELECTronic 1242 Voting System, http://guardianvoting.com/gvs/vs.html (last visited
Mar.

2,

zolO). One-hundred nineteen of the Izo counties, however, now also use a modern

computer-based voting booth that would not require printing separate ballots or switching
papers. Ky. STATE BD.OF ELECTIONS, supra.
i81 Joelle Tessler, Broadband Goals Won't Be Met Easily; Goal Is to Keep U.S. Compeitive,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16, 2010, at BUS8. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
has set as its goal "to connect Ioo million households at ioo megabits per second-at least 20
times faster than most current home connections-by 2020." Id. Approximately two-thirds of
U.S. households currently have access to high-speed Internet. Id.
182 See supra text accompanying note 168.
183 Maxwell Spanish Immersion Magnet Elementary School, http:l/www.fcps.net/
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If the English-only restriction were to be taken seriously, teachers and
administrators could not distribute homework copied using government
machines and government paper in the language of students who attend
those schools. The restriction would also hinder other traditional municipal
functions (i.e., libraries, government bills, and court documents), as the
government could never send letters in languages understood by the
non-English speaking population in an effort to collect taxes or gather
information. If a county hospital, likely to serve an indigent non-English
speaking community, could not use documents in languages other than
English, the government interest in savings and efficiency becomes
even more absurd. The emergency room would slow to a crawl while
non-English speakers required translators from the staff to help fill out
necessary paperwork. The hospital would have to hire more staff to keep
the emergency room running efficiently, which inevitably would cost much
more than printing a few official government documents in languages other
than English.
Under this content-neutral standard, the Commonwealth would not be
able to justify a full ban on non-English government documents, including
ballots and other election materials. The government interest would
arguably rise to the substantial level required for the content-neutral
intermediate scrutiny review, but the ban would not likely survive the
narrowly tailored requirement of the second prong.
C. RequiringEnglish-Only Violates FirstAmendment Rights-The Conduct
Consider, as well, a clerk in a more immigrant-friendly county that
wishes to offer the service of ballots and registration forms in its citizens'
native languages. While a court would likely not overturn an English-only
requirement on its own, a court could view this restriction as a violation of
the clerk's right to provide an invitation to the local immigrant population
to better participate in the workings of their government.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that some
conduct looks so much like communication that it is covered by the
First Amendment and incorporated to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment.'1 4 In determining if conduct amounts to speech protected by
the United States Constitution, the Court looks at whether "[aln intent

schools/elementary/maxwell- (last visited Jan. 26, 2010) (describing the partial Spanish
immersion model); New Building Cements Lasting Partnership, http://www.fcps.netlnews/
press-releases/2oo6-o7/new-building-cements-last (last visited Jan. 26, 201o) (describing
Saturday classes offered for Japanese students studying in the United States); 2020 Vision:
Changing the Face of Education in Fayette County, Final Report, http://www.fcps.net/
media/16295/2ozolanguages.doc (last visited Jan. 26,2010) (detailing recommendations to the
Fayette County Public School System to expand their "World Language" programs).
184 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
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to convey a particularized message was present," and whether "in the
surrounding circumstances[,] the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it."' 5 The Court also examines
the context of the conduct in determining whether the conduct rises to the
level of protected speech.'
If a county clerk wanted to make a statement regarding immigration
policies or welcome those who cannot read English to take part in their
government, a likely part of this statement would include the use of a
non-English language on ballots and other documents. The context of
this conduct would ensure that the message is presented loud and clear.
As will be explored in Part V of this Note, both the anti-immigration
rhetoric and the "English as an official language" movement continue to
play a prevalent role in today's society. Taking the current political climate
into account, many Kentuckians could associate a move to add a different
language to a county's ballot almost instantaneously with immigration or
welcoming those who cannot speak English to become civically active. In
fact, the communication would likely become fodder for conservative talk
shows and other conservative media. The intention would be present and
the message would be clearly understood.
In much the same way as the Court uses two tests based on contentbased and content-neutral restrictions," 7 the Court applies two tests to
expressive conduct based on whether the restriction attempts to ban the
free expression itself. 8 In holding a Texas statute banning flag burning an
unconstitutional restriction on the First Amendment, the Supreme Court
noted that the statute sought to protect "onlookers from being offended
by the ideas expressed by the prohibited activity."189 The Court decided
that the statutory evaluation required "the most exacting scrutiny"' 9
and determined that "[w]hether [the defendant's] treatment of the flag
violated Texas law thus depended on the likely communicative impact of
his expressive conduct." 19' If the restriction does not deal with the free
expression involved in the conduct, the standard becomes the same as that
used for restrictions on content-neutral communication.192
Considering Kentucky's policy regarding the use of English-only
documents, the case will require some showing that the restriction carries
185 Id. at 4io-II.
186 Id. at 41o.
187 See supranotes 165-73 and accompanying text.

I88 SeeTexas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,4o6-07 (1989).
189 Id. at 412 n.7.
19o Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
191 Id. at 411.

192 See id.at 4o6-07; see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. z88,
& n.7 (1984).
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another purpose besides efficiency in government. This could include
xenophobia or political rationales such as uniting the country or keeping
Latinos or other language minorities out of the political system. Such a
purpose necessarily entails the protection of the public from the expression
of an idea of inclusion that may offend them. Kentucky's legislature showed
this motive in House Resolution 242 in 2004, whereby the state House
of Representatives urged the United States Congress to adopt English
as an official language.193 The House justified its proposal by stating that
the declaration of "English as the official language is essential for uniting
English[,
Americans[,] ... U.S. immigrants would be encouraged to learn
' 94
and] ... learning English would be beneficial to immigrants."'
Because a restriction must serve substantial state interests in order to
overcome careful scrutiny, the present state interests in an English-only
restriction will not likely suffice. Efficiency in government, though a
legitimate state interest, cannot serve as an interest substantial enough to
restrict a fundamental right. If a clerk were to take the actions described
above, the English-only requirement for government documents could
have a tough time surviving careful scrutiny and a court could find a
violation of the First Amendment.

IV. THE

BROADER IMPLICATION-LocAL RESTRICTIONS IN THE FACE OF
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965

The above analyses will remain relevant in the present political climate.
The English-only movement continues to try to get a foothold in this
country in light of the current immigration issue. The non-profit lobbying
group English First frames its argument in its symbol, the Statue of Liberty
torch, which it says captures "the spirit of immigrants who learned English
and became full members of American society."' 9 Put simply, as the
immigration debate continues to permeate American society, the push to
make English the official language will continue.
Thirty states now have laws requiring their governments to print all
materials in English, 96 and as of 2008 nineteen other legislatures were
considering similar measures. 197 California, Texas, Florida, Colorado, North
Carolina, and New York have all passed constitutional amendments with
a large majority.19 8 Voters from the city of Nashville, however, voted not to
193
194
195
196

H. R. Res. 242,
Id.

2004

Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2004).

English First, http://www.englishfirst.org (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
William M. Welch, English-Only Laws GatheringSteam, USA TODAY, June 19, 2008, at

3A.
197 Id.
198 Robert H. Spiro, Jr., Commentary, English:Make It Official,WASH. TiMEs, Apr. 18, 2oo8,
atAi8.
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require English for all government business.199 In Kentucky, the city of Inez
went the other way, voting to make English its official language in May of
2006.100 Either way, local governments must take into consideration, before
putting the issue on the ballot, what these "mandates" prohibiting the use
of other languages will mean when the Hispanic/Latino population crosses
the threshold set forth by the Voting Rights Act of 1965.11 ' Put differently,
these governments could face challenges to their English-only policies
based on the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which makes "the
Laws of the United States ...the supreme Law of the Land." 02

The Seventh Circuit took up this exact issue in PuertoRican Organization
for PoliticalAction v. Kusper.30° A federal district court in Chicago entered
an order for an injunction requiring the Chicago Board of Election
Commissioners to provide voting assistance in Spanish to U.S. citizens from
Puerto Rico who were unable to read or understand English.2 04 In doing
so, it required the commissioners to print instructions and other support
material in Spanish.0 5 It also required bilingual election judges in various
precincts in the areas with the most need.2 06
On appeal, the U.S. citizens from Puerto Rico did not argue the refusal
of Spanish assistance on its own was unconstitutional, but rather that it
conflicted with the Voting Rights Act of 1965.07 In upholding the injunction,
the court held that the district court had jurisdiction to enter the injunction
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.208 In doing so, the
Seventh Circuit compared the plight of Spanish-speaking U.S. citizens to
that of African-American voters who were instructed to vote for an AfricanAmerican candidate in a special election by casting a straight-ticket ballot
in Louisiana.0 9 Unfortunately, the Louisiana election officials discovered
they could not set up the machines to handle the straight-ticket ballot
199 Editorial, A Vote for Tolerance,CHATrANOOGA FREE PRESS, Jan. 24, 2009, at B6.
zoo Nick Coleman, English-Only Idea No Es Muy Inteligente, STAR "MIBINE(Minneapolis,
Minn.), June 18, 2oo6,at i B.
201 See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
202 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
203 Puerto Rican Org. for Pol. Action v. Kusper, 490 Fzd 575, 578-79 (7th Cir. 1973).
204 Id. at 576. The author acknowledges the Voting Rights Act of 1965 does contain an
express provision prohibiting the states "from conditioning the right to vote [based on the]
ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English language" when dealing with Puerto Rican citizens and other citizens "educated in American-flag schools in which
the predominant classroom language was other than English." 42 U.S.C. I973b(e)(i) (zoo6).
The court's analysis, however, of the Supremacy Clause in relation to the Voting Rights Act of
1965 appears applicable and will be used in this Note accordingly.
205 Kusper; 490 E2d at 576-77.
2o6 Id. at 577.
207

Id. at 578.

2o8 Id.
209 Id. at 579-80 (citing United States v. Post, 297 F Supp. 46 (W.D. La. 1969)).
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and a number of voters cast incorrect votes. 10 A federal court in Louisiana
would eventually void the election. " ' In a similar way, the court in Kusper
ruled that the Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican has the right to "assistance
in the language he can read or understand." '
The Voting Rights Act, however, covers more than U.S. citizens born
in Puerto Rico. Congress has found that "the denial of the right to vote
of [language minorities] is ordinarily directly related to the unequal
educational opportunities afforded them, resulting in high illiteracy and low
voting participation." ' 3 As a result, Congress has declared that "in order to
enforce the guarantees of the [F]ourteenth and [F]ifteenth [A]mendments
to the United States Constitution," states or political subdivisions meeting
certain triggers in their population must provide voting materials in
languages other than English by 2032.14 The statute states that when more
than 10,000 voting age citizens of a political subdivision or more than five
percent of the voting age citizens of a state or political subdivision are nonEnglish speaking citizens, the state or political subdivision must provide
"notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information
relating to the electoral process, including ballots ...

in the language of

the applicable minority group as well as in the English language." ' 5 The
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice has chosen to enforce
the provision with success in recent years.216 During the 1990s, the Justice
Department obtained orders or consent decrees remedying violations of
the Voting Rights Act in three cases. 1 7 During the 2000s, that number rose
above thirty." 8
The principle of federalism will also not act as a shield for Englishonly provisions. As seen in Katzenbach v. Motgan '9 and South Carolina v.
Katzenbach,2 0 Congress acted rightfully under its Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment powers in enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the
Supremacy Clause makes it applicable to the states.22 ' In upholding the
specific provision dealing with Puerto Ricans discussed by the Seventh
E Supp. at 46).
Id. (citing Post, 297 E Supp. at 46).
212 Id.
213 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-ia(a) (2006).
214 Id. §§ 1973aa-la(a) to 1973aa-la(b)(i).
215 Id. §§ 1973aa-la(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)--(III) to 1973aa-la(c). There are, however, limited exceptions to this requirement. Id. §§ 1973aa-ia(c) to 19 7 3aa-la(d).
216 United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Home Page,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/litigation/recent2o3.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
217 Id.
z18 Id.
219 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
220 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
221 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 646-47; Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325-26.
210 Id. at 580 (citing Post,297
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Circuit, the United States Supreme Court held this portion of the Voting
Rights Act as "prohibit[ing] the State from denying to that community the
right that is 'preservative of all rights."'"" 2 In so doing, the Court called
"[tihis enhanced political power ... helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory
2 '2 3
treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican community.
Political subdivisions, however, have begun to argue that the Voting Rights
Act of 1965's requirements and restrictions should no longer have effect
4
since the problems of the past have been remedied.11
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF

1965

Within a month of the 2006 renewal of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
the Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One (District)
filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Act's provisions
requiring "preclearance" to change voting practices that mandate ballots
and other documents in Spanish."' According to the District, Texas fell
under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in 1975 when the United States
Attorney General found that election materials were only offered in
English, more than five percent of the state's voting age population spoke
Spanish, and less than fifty percent of voting age citizens had voted in
the 1972 presidential election.2 6 The District alleged that Congress
reauthorized the preclearance provision without specifically identifying
evidence of current discrimination.2 7 Moreover, the District maintained
that Texas had remedied the discriminatory conditions which caused
the state to be subject to the preclearance provision in the past."2 8 The
District called the restrictions "both arbitrary and irrational for Congress to
continue."'2 9 The complaint stated, "Times have changed, and § 5, [which
mandated the "preclearance" procedure], should now be struck down as
222 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,370(i886)).
223 Id.
224 See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
225 Complaint at 4, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Gonzales, 573 F. Supp. 2d
221 (D.D.C. 2oo6) (No. o6CVor384). The case would have three names before the Supreme
Court of the United States decided it in 2oo9. The complaint was filed in the D.C. District
Court against then-U.S. Attorney General, Alberto Gonzalez. Complaint, supra.At the time
of the district court decision, the court changed the name to reflect the new U.S. Attorney
General, Michael B. Mukasey. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp.
2d 221, 283 (D.D.C. 2oo8), rev'd, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct.
2504 (2oo9). By the time the Supreme Court of the United States made its final decision, Eric
Holder had become the new U.S. Attorney General, resulting again, in another name change.
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2oo9).
226 Complaint, supranote 225, at 2.
227 Id.

228 Id. at 4.
229 Id.
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unconstitutional, either on its face, or as applied to the [D]istrict." 30 The
District also requested a "bail-out," allowed under section 4 of the Act, from
the "preclearance" requirement which would have allowed it to get out of
the statutory requirements based on the District's prior compliance with
the Act's key provisions in the years prior to the filing of its complaint.2 3'
The D.C. District Court ruled the statute passed constitutional muster
under the stricter Fourteenth Amendment "congruent and proportional"
analysis and the less strict Fifteenth Amendment "rationality" standard.3"
The district court also held the bailout provision applied only to counties
and parishes that do not register their voters, but not to smaller similarlyZ3
situated subdivisions like the municipal utility district 31
In June of 2009, the United States Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the D.C. District Court's holding by an 8-1 vote.3M Chief Justice
John Roberts wrote for the majority and allowed the District to seek bailout from the preclearance requirements, but the opinion did "not reach
the constitutionality of [the preclearance provision of the Voting Rights
Act]. 235 In deciding not to take up the constitutionality of the preclearance
requirement, the Court stated, "[I]t is a well-established principle
governing the prudent exercise of this Court's jurisdiction that normally
the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other
ground upon which to dispose of the case. '' 236 It did, however, spend more
than two pages discussing federalism concerns and the constitutionality of
23 7

the Act.

In another federal constitutional challenge to the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 from a racial re-districting case in North Carolina, the Court
held in March 2009 that "[iut is common ground that state election-law
requirements . . .may be superseded by federal law-for instance, the

one-person, one-vote principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution." 2 8 The Court also acknowledged the following
regarding the interpretation of the Voting Rights Act:
[R]acial discrimination and racially polarized voting are not ancient history.
Much remains to be done to ensure that citizens of all races have equal

230
231
232

Id.
Id.
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 283 (D.D.C.
i29 S.Ct. 2504 (2oo9).

2oo8), ry'd, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder,
233 Id. at 230-35.
234 Holdr, 129 S. Ct. 2504.
235 Id. at 2508.

236 Id. at 2513 (quoting Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48,51 (1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Id. at 2511-13.
238 Bartlett v. Strickland,
237

129 S.Ct. 1231,

1239 (2oo9).
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opportunity to share and participate in our democratic processes and
traditions; and [the Voting
Rights Act] must be interpreted to ensure that
2 39
continued progress."

It also held, however, that states have the right to decide how they comply
with the Act, warning that "[riacial classifications with respect to voting
carry particular dangers ... [threatening] to carry us further from the goal
of a political system in which race no longer matters-a goal that the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation
continues to aspire.""
While the Court acknowledges "the constitutionality of an Act of
Congress is 'the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to
perform,"''" it also recognizes that it "will not shrink from [its] duty 'as the
'2 42
bulwar[k] of a limited constitution against legislative encroachments."'
The Court has also openly acknowledged that the preclearance section of
2 43
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 presents "a difficult constitutional question,"
with at least one Justice stating the requirement "exceeds Congress' power
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment." 2 In other words, with the right
case that challenges provisions based solely on constitutionality, the Act
may not survive.
As the country continues to make progress toward equal access to the
ballot box and government, the question becomes what other requirements
could face a similar attack. As stated previously, the mandatory foreign
language requirements in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 already face an open
attack with states and communities passing English-only requirements
in reaction to the immigration debate. 4 Thus, the Voting Rights Act of
1965 could serve as the only protection for non-English speakers, and its
validity could prove as difficult a constitutional question as the Englishonly requirement itself.
CONCLUSION-KENTUCKY AND OTHER LOCALITIES SHOULD TAKE GREAT
CARE WITH "ENGLISH AS OFFICIAL LANGUAGE" STATUTES

In the end, local governments and non-English speaking citizens could
challenge the Board staff's interpretation regarding a ban on languages other

239 Id. at 1249.
240 Id. at 1247 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (I993)) (internal quotations
marks omitted).
241 Holder, 129 S. Ct. at 2513 (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147-48 (1927)).
242 Id. at 2513 (quoting ThE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke

ed., 1961)).
243 Id. at 2516.

244 Id. at 2517 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
245 See supraPart IV.
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than English under the Kentucky Constitution's Bill of Rights and Equal
Protection Clause as well as the United States Constitution's Fourteenth
Amendment. The result of the challenge, however, could depend on
the circumstances these non-English speaking citizens face in the
Commonwealth. Despite the stagnant support for non-English speakers,
evidenced through the lack of non-English media outlets, a challenge
against Kentucky's provision may have a better chance at success in light
of the continuous growth in the Spanish-speaking population. A successful
challenge against any restriction on the use of non-English languages in
official documents, however, may still require help from a willing clerk
ready to offer the invitation to participate in government to non-English
speakers. Either way, the moment the population reaches the trigger in
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Board and local governments will have
a hard time avoiding the provision requiring voting materials in languages
other than English due to the Supremacy Clause and enough citizens being
deprived of their right to vote. The ultimate question is whether the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, as we presently know it, will still offer protection once
Kentucky's political subdivisions reach that benchmark.

